The human infant has traditionally provided a Rorschach test for biological and social theory. Although behaviours that appear early in development are not necessarily innate (see Lehrman, 1970) , and biologically underpinned traits may appear late in life (e.g. hair loss), theorists nonetheless look to infants as a mirror of human nature. For example, the study of aggression is currently dominated by a neo-Hobbesian approach that emphasizes infants' innate aggressive tendencies (see Tremblay, Hartup, & Archer, 2005) . The present article presents a most welcome alternative view of human nature. The authors' rigorous and ingenious empirical work has revitalized the study of the development of altruism.
The ubiquity of early prosocial behaviour
The argument rests on experiments on human infants. Some might query whether the infants tested in these laboratory experiments are indeed representative of all young humans. However, there is much corroborative evidence. Early forms of sharing, helping, cooperation, and sympathy have been recorded throughout history, by the early baby biographers (e.g. Shinn, 19OO; Tiedemann, 1787 , translated by Murchison & Langer, 1927) and pioneers of developmental psychology (e.g. Murphy, 1937; Stern, 1924; Valentine, 1942) . Young children's prosocial behaviour has been observed across cultures, as well as historical epochs (Whiting, 1983) .
Among the qualitative observations reported by these early scholars are clear instances of instrumental helping. For example, one diary-keeping mother described her 18-month-old as follows: 'She works alongside me in the garden, manages to rake or use a trowel fairly well... In the house, she helps push the vacuum or mop. . . anticipates her father's needs in dressing or in building a fire in the fireplace' (Church, 1966, pp. 71-72) . Valentine (1942) recorded that his toddler son was 'Very thoughtful nowadays. When I came in this morning, he said, 'Daddy want slippers', and ran off to get them' (p. 321). Rheingold (1982) sought to corroborate these anecdotes, and so transformed her laboratory into a home with many undone tasks (a table to set, a bed to make, books and cards to pick up from the floor, scraps of paper to sweep up, and laundry to fold). The majority of 18-to 30-month-olds enthusiastically helped their parents with the housework. Supplementary home observations revealed that all 2-yearolds studied helped their mothers (and the observer), and clearly stated their helpful intentions, e.g. 'I help you, I hold that little light bulb', which suggests that they understood what it means to help (Hay & Rheingold, 1983) .
Given that toddlers' helpful behaviours have been noted for centuries, why do most parents and developmental psychologists still believe that children are naturally aggressive and need to be taught how to help or share, despite the fact that toddlers' spontaneous sharing occurs at higher rates than their aggression (Hay, Castle, & Davies, 2000) ? In Rheingold's view, the descriptive facts were not assimilated by most psychologists because the facts ran counter to most developmental theory: 'The prosocial behaviours are. . . predictable outcomes of infants' biological characteristics and the experiences afforded to them in human homes. Yet typically, the behaviours have not been remarked; no current theory of social development -not psychoanalytic, attachment theory, cognitive-developmental theory, nor even social learning theory -would predict a prosocial infant. Hence, the data warrant a new conception of infants and their social development' (Rheingold & Hay, 1978, p. 104) .
The present authors' programme of work indeed sets forth a new conception of the human infant and calls attention to a more compatible theoretical framework, evolutionary biology. Whilst I am in complete agreement with the authors that prosocial behaviour emerges early in life, and is underpinned by the biological nature of the human infant, I do have some reservations about the very strong claim that infants' instrumental helping is a pure form of human altruism, and a behavioural phenotype that has been selected for in the course of human evolution. Rather, I believe that multiple functions of infants' helping can be identified at the ontogenetic and episodic as well as the phylogenetic levels of analysis (Sommerhoff, 1950) , and that one should not assume a trait is an adaptation favoured by selection until competing explanations are tested (Gottlieb, 1997; Williams, 1966) . It is important to understand how ontogenetic processes refine the development of the ability to help others with their tasks, and also to identify factors in the immediate episode of social interaction that support helping, including features of the task that elicit the toddler's 'executive competence' (Wenar, 1972) and problem-solving skills (Chen & Siegler, 2000) .
These considerations lead me to pose two questions to the authors: Firstly, what rules of evidence need to be applied in comparative studies in order to identify the 'phylogenetic roots of human altruism'? Secondly, what ontogenetic processes influence the emergence of helpful behaviour in infancy and its differentiation over time?
Comparing helpfulness ¡n different species: Analogies or homologies?
Which species and which ages should be compared?
In making their evolutionary claims, the present authors adduce evidence from two sources: laboratory studies of human infants and analogous studies of nursery-born and wild born chimpanzees. They argue that demonstration of instrumental helping in a close biological relative provides evidence about the phylogenetic roots of the behaviour. However, one may ask, if species-typical helpAilness has been selected for in evolution, should species be more different? Should we in fact expect chimpanzees to perform less well on tests designed for human babies? What exactly does it mean to compare human infants with adults of another species? Why not compare infants with adults of their own species?
The present comparison rests on the implicit assumption that non-verbal, instrumental helping is a behavioural phenotype that may take a homologous form in the non-verbal interactions of another species. But does this then imply that the nonverbal form of instrumental helping shown by infants and chimpanzees is not akin to more complex forms of helping in human adulthood? Obviously the different types of help offered by adult humans to their conspecifics might look very different from the tasks invented by these authors, but is adults' rate of helping all that different from infants and chimpanzees? For example, in one observational study, we found that toddlers behave sensitively to distressed peers at about the same rate that adults help distressed bystanders in airports (Demetriou & Hay, 2004) . It would be helpful for the authors to spell out the logic of further comparisons of species and ages that are needed to support their hypotheses.
The interpretation of null results
The authors note that not every research group has found chimpanzees to be all that helpful. How should one interpret null results from one research group versus evidence for empathy or altruism from other laboratories? What is needed is a meta-analysis of published and unpublished findings from the various samples of non-human primates observed w^ith reference to potentially cooperative or altruistic behaviour. However, in undertaking such a task, we need to consider whether the absence of altruistic behaviour in any particular species, tested under specific conditions, necessarily undermines the case for the evolutionary basis of human altruism. It may prove important to scrutinize the qualitative observations made in the very many observational studies of primate species to look for analogues as well as homologues to human helpfulness, such as protection and alliance in conflict situations (e.g. Kummer, 1978) .
Ontogenetic processes: Development and differentiation

Change and differentiation over time
Once a rudimentary ability to help other people emerges in the human repertoire, what happens next? Do children become more helpful with age? There is consistent evidence for increases in the rate of prosocial behaviour as children grow older (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006) ; on the other hand, in the early childhood years, prosocial behaviour also becomes more selective, directed to friends and relations, not all conspeciñcs, and increasingly governed by display rules and social norms (Hay & Cook, 2007) . Heritable individual differences in empathy and prosocial behaviour soon emerge (Knafo & Plomin, 2006; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 1992) . Thus, the very high rates of helpfulness observed in nearly all toddlers are likely to decline in favour of more selective displays of helpfulness by particular children to particular people, under particular conditions.
It's not just learning
Early prosocial behaviours are not easily explained by straightforward learning processes. As the present authors have demonstrated, rewarding toddlers for prosocial behaviour may actually depress its frequency. In our laboratory, we similarly found that rewarding 18-month-olds for sharing objects did not increase the rate of sharing (Rlieingold, 1973) . Furthermore, we found that modelling sharing did not increase its rate, as opposed to modelling a 'selfish' social action, i.e. asking for an object with outstretched hand; asking for objects, and especially modelling both actions together, promoted immediate sharing with the experimenter and later sharing with the mother (Hay & Murray, 1982) .
In their day-to-day lives, children's prosocial behaviour only rarely meets with approval or reward from adults; preschool teachers are more likely to reward helpñilness in the context of pretend play than in children's real interactions with classmates (Caplan & Hay, 1989; Eisenberg, Cameron, Tryon, & Dodez, 1981) . Thus, I concur with one of the main conclusions of the present authors: infants' and toddlers' near universal impulse to share, cooperate, and be helpful is not easily explained by simple learning processes.
However, we must not conclude that children learn nothing about prosocial behaviour. What is acquired over the first years of life is not the motivation to share, or be helpful and sympathetic. Infants don't have to learn to care about other people, but tbey learn how to care for tbem. One-and two-year-olds' pretend play with dolls and teddies reveals extensive knowledge about how to look after the young (Rheingold & Emery, 1986) . By 3 years of age, children can tell an interviewer a great deal about how to minister to their distressed classmates, although they do not think it is their personal responsibility to do so (Caplan & Hay, 1989) . Thus, early versions of the social norms that govern prosocial behaviour in adults -responsibility, deservingness, and reciprocity norms -already influence young children's sharing and sympathy (Hay, Castle, Davies, Demetriou, & Stimson, 1999) ; might they also begin to influence instrumental helping?
What has been selected for: Altruism or sociability? I began by comparing the authors' welcome focus on the roots of altruism with other contem]îorary accounts that focus on the intrinsically aggressive nature of human infants. These opposing interpretations of the nature of human nature derive from observations of infants' non-verbal interactions with their conspecifics; helpful infants are also capable of using force against other people. Developmental psychologists have long noted that, in very young children, cooperation can co-occur with conflict, and prosocial behaviour may be positively correlated with aggression (e.g. Murphy, 1937) .
In a longitudinal study of toddlers observed with familiar peers (Hay, 2006) , we found that, at the time of the first home visit, sharing was positively associated with the use of force (especially tugging on toys), and what might be interpreted as the egoistic use of possessive pronouns (e.g. saying 'Mine!'). However, 6 months later, sharing and the use of force were no longer significantly correlated; aggression had disaggregated from other forms of sociability. Furthermore, the 'egoistic' act of claiming possession over objects predicted sharing, not the use of force at the second visit.
The fact that different forms of toddlers' behaviour thought to measure opposing traits are initially correlated raises important questions about the operational definitions of phenotypes in evolutionary studies. (Similar problems plague genetic studies of children's psychological problems: the human genome may not be precisely lined up with DSM-rV.) I suggest that the authors take a closer look at earlier-appearing social phenotypes, the fundamental skills that support all forms of social intercourse among humans -altruism, cooperation, enlightened self-interest, and aggression. Infants come equipped with perceptual biases that promote attention to the human face and voice and sensitivity to emotion that may lead to empathy and contagion of fear and anger; they soon develop species-typical forms of non-verbal and verbal communication. I believe that more complex, cognitively informed social activities, such as intentional aggression, instrumental helping, and sympathetic responses to distress derive from these basic social skills, refined and deployed through emergent processes of motor maturation, learning and neurocognitive development. Studies of aggression in humans and other mammals clearly show the interplay between genetic traits and rearing environments (Gottlieb, 1997) ; for example, after 28 generations of artificial selection, mice who had been selected for aggressive genotypes only fight at high rates after being subjected to social isolation (Hood & Xie, 2007) . In humans, genotype interacts with the experience of maltreatment to promote antisocial behaviour (Caspi et al, 2002) . Similar interplay between the genetic heritage of our species and the characteristics of human environments no doubt influences prosocial development. We do not need to speculate whether human infants are naturally aggressive nor altruistic. Infants are indubitably social, and their innate social skills and motivation underpin their proclivities for both helpfulness and aggression.
Over the childhood years, humans acquire the ability to balance their prosocial tendencies with their individual needs. They learn how to share, sympathize and be helpftil to others while negotiating their own entitlements to space and resources. The move from universal, non-verbal sociability to cognitively informed judgements about the conditions under which it is appropriate to be helpful is one of the main achievements of early childhood. Developmental scientists need to study how children construct representations of self within the framework ofthe norms of their societies, if we are to understand exactly how the distinctly human form of altruism branches off from its phylogenetic roots.
